Bazel module extension that provisions development tools through
OCX — the OCI-backed package manager. Bootstrap the pinned
ocx CLI inside a repository rule, then let it resolve, download, and compose
tool packages; consume them as ordinary runnable Bazel targets.
rules_ocx deliberately never re-implements OCX internals in Starlark. All
resolution goes through the ocx binary; the durable contracts are
ocx.lock digests and the OCI manifests.
# MODULE.bazel
bazel_dep(name = "rules_ocx", version = "0.5.0")
ocx = use_extension("@rules_ocx//ocx:extensions.bzl", "ocx")
# Flagship: provision the workspace toolchain from ocx.toml + ocx.lock.
ocx.project(
name = "tools",
ocx_toml = "//:ocx.toml",
ocx_lock = "//:ocx.lock",
)
# Ad-hoc: a single package, tag-floating or digest-pinned.
ocx.package(
name = "jq",
package = "ocx.sh/jqlang/jq:latest",
)
use_repo(ocx, "jq", "tools")# BUILD.bazel
genrule(
name = "pretty",
srcs = ["data.json"],
outs = ["pretty.json"],
cmd = "$(location @jq//:jq) . $< > $@",
tools = ["@jq//:jq"],
)
sh_test(
name = "lint",
srcs = ["lint_test.sh"],
data = ["@tools//:shellcheck"],
env = {"SHELLCHECK_BIN": "$(location @tools//:shellcheck)"},
)Every executable the toolchain's packages declare as their public surface
(ocx inspect --closure, default group) becomes a runnable target
@tools//:<name>; a host-platform ocx.package() exposes its own the same
way at @<name>//:<bin> (with platforms = [...] the launchers live in the
per-platform repos — the @<name> hub aliases only //:content, or the lazy
bins names). A declared name that no directory on the composed PATH holds is
dropped silently — a missing target raises no error, so check
bazel query @tools//... if one you expected is absent.
Private executables stay out of the target list only while every package
declares a complete binaries surface. If one does not, the fetch falls back
to scanning PATH, which exposes that package's private executables too;
//:env.bzl's OCX_SCANNED_PACKAGES names the packages that forced it.
ocx.package() also symlinks the package's entrypoints/ next to
content/ — a separate ocx list, not targets.
- The
ocxextension creates@ocx_toolby downloading the pinned ocx release listed in the vendoreddist/dist.jsonsnapshot ofhttps://setup.ocx.sh/dist.json(sha256-verified). ocx.project()/ocx.package()repository rules shell out to that binary:ocx lock --check(staleness gate),ocx pull/ocx package install(populate the content-addressed store),ocx --format json env --pinned(composed environment).- Packages live in the shared
OCX_HOMEstore (~/.ocxby default) — content-addressed, digest-pinned, hardlink-composed. Repository rules run unsandboxed, so the store is shared with your shell and CI, fetched once per machine. - Generated repos contain launcher scripts (skylib
native_binary) that apply the package environment and exec the store binaries — usable intools =,$(location …),sh_testenv, andbazel run.
Same knobs as the setup.ocx.sh installer, honored by the repository rules:
| Env var | Effect |
|---|---|
OCX_INSTALL_DIST_URL |
Fetch the release manifest from your mirror instead of the vendored snapshot. The mirrored manifest is itself verified when it is named <sha256>.json (the form the setup.ocx.sh installers write); any other name is fetched unverified. |
OCX_INSTALL_MIRROR_URL |
Rewrite the ocx binary download to <mirror>/<tag>/<filename>. The artifact sha256 is enforced either way — a mirror can move bytes, not change them. |
OCX_MIRRORS |
JSON map {"ocx.sh": "https://mirror.corp/ocx"} — package pulls go to the mirror; ocx.lock digests stay keyed to the upstream host, so lockfiles are portable. |
OCX_INSECURE_REGISTRIES |
Allow plain-HTTP mirrors (comma list). |
OCX_AUTH_<REGISTRY>_{TYPE,USER,TOKEN} |
Registry credentials (also: docker config). Not enumerable by Bazel — run bazel fetch --force after changing auth. |
Passed through to repo rules as well: OCX_INDEX, OCX_OFFLINE,
OCX_FROZEN, OCX_REMOTE, OCX_JOBS, OCX_DEFAULT_REGISTRY, OCX_CONFIG,
OCX_NO_CONFIG, OCX_MANAGED_CONFIG, OCX_PATCHES, OCX_PATCH_SNAPSHOT,
OCX_SIGSTORE_TRUSTED_ROOT, OCX_EXTRA_CA_CERTS (extra TLS roots, e.g. a
corporate proxy CA) — together with OCX_MIRRORS and OCX_INSECURE_REGISTRIES above, that is
the whole forwarded set. OCX_HOME is resolved rather than forwarded: it
selects the store the rules point ocx at.
The three path-valued ones (OCX_CONFIG, OCX_PATCH_SNAPSHOT,
OCX_SIGSTORE_TRUSTED_ROOT) must be absolute: a repository rule runs from
Bazel's own working directory, so a relative value names a different file than
it does in your shell and Bazel cannot watch it — it is refused rather than
forwarded unwatched. file:// on the trusted root is the one accepted
spelling (ocx parses that one as a file reference): it is forwarded verbatim
and watched at the path behind the prefix, which must itself be absolute. Any
other scheme, and file:// on the other two, are refused like any relative
value.
OCX_NO_VERIFY and OCX_ALLOW_YANKED are not among them: those two knobs
are never read from the environment and are written on every invocation, so an
exported value cannot switch verification off or let a yanked package through.
Ask for either explicitly with ocx.policy(...) below.
Migrating: OCX_ALLOW_YANKED used to be forwarded. A CI job that exported
it now resolves as if it had not — silently, with no error. (OCX_NO_VERIFY is
new with ocx 0.6.0 and was never forwarded.) Move the intent into MODULE.bazel:
# before: OCX_ALLOW_YANKED=1 in the CI environment
ocx.policy(allow_yanked = True) # afterThat is the explicit pair, not the whole surface. OCX_SIGSTORE_TRUSTED_ROOT
is site-authoritative: with no sigstore_trusted_root attr set, an exported
value replaces the trust anchor signatures are checked against, and
OCX_MIRRORS/OCX_INSECURE_REGISTRIES redirect the transport. Set
sigstore_trusted_root and pin digests (pins, or an @sha256: reference) to
close both.
OCX_PROJECT, OCX_GLOBAL, OCX_QUIET, OCX_NO_PROJECT,
OCX_NO_CONFIG_REFRESH, OCX_NO_CONSENT and OCX_TOOLCHAIN_DIR are
deliberately not passed through — each carries a fixed value on every
invocation. Project context comes from the explicit
--project flag (which --global refuses to combine with), --quiet would
suppress the JSON reports the rules parse, OCX_NO_PROJECT closes the
directory walk a fetch would otherwise run from Bazel's own working directory,
the managed-config refresh wants a TTY no repo rule has, OCX_NO_CONSENT
means no shell-activation consent stamp is written, and an empty
OCX_TOOLCHAIN_DIR keeps the ocx pull render in the fetched repository.
# MODULE.bazel — root module only, at most one tag; every attr defaults off.
ocx.policy(
allow_unverified = True, # OCX_NO_VERIFY=1 on every ocx call
allow_yanked = True, # OCX_ALLOW_YANKED=1
sigstore_trusted_root = "//:trusted-root.json",
)With no tag the defaults apply and nothing is loosened. The tag cannot enable
verification: ocx attaches that only under an operator-configured
[[trust.policy]], so these attrs can only decline to switch it off. A
non-root or duplicate tag fails the build before any repository is declared.
Root-only governs the tag. The same three attrs also sit on the public
ocx_project_repo / ocx_package_repo rules in //ocx:defs.bzl, so a module
that declares one of those directly — instead of going through this extension —
sets its own posture, and nothing stops it.
ocx layers its site configuration system → user → $OCX_HOME/config.toml →
managed-config snapshot → OCX_CONFIG → --config, and the repository rules
run inside that chain rather than around it: whatever mirrors, registries and
[patches] your host config declares apply to the fetch.
Because Bazel can only invalidate on inputs it knows, every discovered config
path is watched (with three exceptions, below) — including the ones that do
not exist yet. Creating
~/.ocx/config.toml, or letting ocx config update refresh the managed
snapshot, refetches the ocx repos. That is deliberate: a config edit that
changes what a fetch resolves must not survive as a stale cache entry.
Three exceptions: /etc/ocx/config.toml is skipped on Windows (ocx still
reads that literal path there, drive-relative, but it is not an absolute
Windows path and cannot be watched as spelled — a documented gap),
isolated_home = True drops the $OCX_HOME-rooted tiers (they sit
inside the repository being fetched, which Bazel cannot watch), and a lazy
ocx.package(bins = …) watches no tier at all — it never runs ocx at fetch
time, so its launcher resolves the host config live on first execution
instead. ocx.project(bins = …) is unaffected: it builds — and watches — the
environment before the lazy branch, because its ocx lock --check needs it.
Two attrs on both ocx.project() and ocx.package() take the host out of the
loop:
ocx.project(
name = "dev_tools",
ocx_toml = "//:ocx.toml",
ocx_lock = "//:ocx.lock",
config = "//:ocx-config.toml", # committed site config
no_config = True, # ignore every discovered tier
)config sets OCX_CONFIG (overriding an ambient one) and is watched;
no_config sets OCX_NO_CONFIG=1, dropping the system, user, $OCX_HOME and
managed tiers while keeping an explicit config. It also blanks an ambient
OCX_CONFIG, OCX_PATCHES and OCX_PATCH_SNAPSHOT, which OCX_NO_CONFIG
alone does not prune — so a CI job that exports OCX_PATCH_SNAPSHOT and sets
no_config = True loses its patch pinning unless it also passes the
patch_snapshot attr, and nothing diagnoses that. Together the two attrs are
the hermetic pattern — the build reads exactly the file you committed. Lazy
launchers (bins) carry both into their runfiles, so a deferred
ocx exec / ocx package exec sees the same configuration the fetch did —
which also means each file is copied into the repository and uploaded as an
input with every action: keep credentials out of them.
Patches are companion packages a site config composes onto a base package's
environment (a [patches] table; never the project ocx.toml). ocx lock --check deliberately does not cover them, so freeze them explicitly:
$ ocx patch freeze # writes patches.snapshot.json next to ocx.lockCommit that file and point patch_snapshot = "//:patches.snapshot.json" at
it — it sets OCX_PATCH_SNAPSHOT and pins the companion digests. Without it,
companions resolve at fetch time. ocx patch sync is the only way to refresh
the snapshot; it mutates and needs the network (offline it exits 81).
Managed config in CI: a [managed] source that is required (the default)
but has never been synced exits 78 on every ocx command — lock --check
included, before any network call. The repository rules never run ocx config setup or ocx config update themselves; adoption stays an explicit human
step. The failure message names the command to run, and no_config = True /
OCX_NO_CONFIG=1 opts the build out of the tier entirely. The background
snapshot refresh is pinned off (OCX_NO_CONFIG_REFRESH=1) — it wants a TTY no
repository rule has.
- Project tier is fully pinned by your committed
ocx.lock(per-platform sha256 digests). A stale lock fails the fetch with instructions. Nothing is written to your checkout: no shell-activation consent stamp (OCX_NO_CONSENT=1, eager fetch and lazy launchers alike), and the toolchain homeocx pullrenders lands in the fetched repository, not in a.ocx/next to yourocx.toml. Launchers compose digest-pinned store paths (--pinned), never the moving.ocx/toolchain/linkstree. - Package tier, pick one:
index = "//:index"— commit an index snapshot (ocx --index index index update ocx.sh/jqlang/jq); tags resolve frozen from it, so:lateststays reproducible until you refresh the snapshot. OCX's native tag locking, works across allplatforms.pins = {"linux/amd64": "sha256:…"}— explicit per-platform manifest digests (reported byocx package install -p <platform>).- Neither: floating tags resolve at fetch time; the fetch log prints the resolved digest.
- Remote execution is a non-goal for now: launchers reference absolute
OCX_HOMEstore paths (the nixpkgs model). Useisolated_home = Trueto keep a store per repository if you need stricter isolation — at the cost of a full per-repository re-download, and it cannot be combined withbins(lazy provisioning) below.
Add bins = [...] to ocx.project() or ocx.package() and nothing is
pulled at fetch time: each name becomes a launcher that re-enters
ocx exec / ocx package exec, materializing content on its first
execution. Tool content never becomes a Bazel action input — actions key on
the lockfile (project) or the digest-pinned reference (package, so pins
or @sha256: is required) — and the POSIX launchers resolve everything
through runfiles, so the keys are identical across machines. The result: a
fully remote-cached build downloads no tool content at all, even on a
pristine machine. The first cache-miss action on a machine pays the pull
once, into the shared content-addressed store.
Trade-offs: bins names are not validated at fetch time, //:content /
//:env.bzl are unavailable (they would need materialized bytes), and the
first executions on a cold machine race on the store
(ocx-sh/ocx#179).
Generated by stardoc into docs/. Regenerate with
bazel run //docs:update.
examples/project— workspace toolchain from ocx.toml/lock, eager + lazyexamples/package— ad-hoc packages: floating, frozen-index, digest-pinned, lazyexamples/cross_platform— per-platform repos + transitions
Apache-2.0. See LICENSE.